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A central project within the scientific study of consciousness is that of uncovering the
role that consciousness has in behavior. Under some accounts, the temporary retention of
information (short-term or working memory) is accomplished via the maintenance of a conscious
representation of that information, and is a candidate function of consciousness (Atkinson and
Shiffrin, 1968; Baars and Franklin, 2003). However, recent experiments demonstrating that stimuli
rated by observers as invisible can nevertheless be retained over a delay period, suggest that working
memory (WM) may, under some conditions, operate unconsciously (Soto et al., 2011; Bergström
and Eriksson, 2014). Accepting this conclusion would raise important questions about the classical
view that WM may be a biological function of consciousness. Complicating this line of research,
however, are long-standing concerns in the study of unconscious cognition as to whether one
can be certain in establishing complete unawareness. Here, I discuss how recent conceptual and
methodological advances in the study of visual awareness might profitably be adapted to study the
role of awareness in WM and to study the functional consequences of conscious perception more
generally.
The strength of the claim that a cognitive process occurs in the absence of awareness rests
on the extent to which absolute unawareness was actually achieved. A problematic issue for any
study investigating unconscious processing is that of assuring that the reporting methodology
employed (1) adequately captures all relevant consciously perceived information, and (2) that
observers truly have complete unawareness when they are claiming so (Overgaard et al., 2006).
If these conditions are not met, behavior seeming to occur unconsciously may actually be the result
of degraded, but conscious perceptual information processing. These issues are particularly salient
with regard to recent experiments testing for unconscious working memory (e.g., Soto et al., 2011).
In these experiments, the researcher’s arguments rely on observers being completely unaware of
all relevant features of the remembered stimulus (otherwise performance could be attributed to
residual conscious processing). As there is currently no consensus regarding the most exhaustive
measure of consciousness (Seth et al., 2008), proving complete unawareness of all relevant features
of a stimulus may be a suboptimal approach to studying the function of consciousness.
An alternative approach, coined “relative blindsight” (Lau and Passingham, 2006), comes from
experimental paradigms in which observers are presented with two or more stimulus conditions
for which their perceptual discrimination performance (e.g., d-prime) is matched, yet, subjectively,
their confidence or reports of having seen the stimulus vary (Lau and Passingham, 2006; Zylberberg
et al., 2012). In these paradigms, awareness is not entirely obliterated, but rather a relative
difference exists between two otherwise performance-matched conditions. This contrast in the level
of awareness effectively isolates the subjective construct of having seen a stimulus while ruling
out confounds due to performance factors like attention, arousal, and motivation, which would
presumably also affect objective performance. Furthermore, whereas many existing approaches
render stimuli unconscious by degrading them until objective performance is at floor, this approach
preserves some performance and thereby alleviates uncertainty that a null finding is simply due to
weak stimuli. These paradigms can be applied to the study of the function of subjective awareness in
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the following way: if, under conditions of relative blindsight,
one condition has fewer trials during which a stimulus
is subjectively seen, any post-perceptual cognitive process
hypothesized to rely on subjective awareness should show a
corresponding decline in functionality, otherwise the cognitive
process cannot be said to depend on subjective awareness.
Although reports about visual awareness are not perfect
reflections of phenomenology, and may be better characterized
as metacognitive, the subjective feeling of knowing that one
has perceived a stimulus often accompanies our conscious
sensations, and should be considered a central aspect of visual
consciousness.
Methodologically, relative blindsight has been induced
by manipulating the absolute amount and the ratio of target
to non-target sensory evidence (Zylberberg et al., 2012),
or by contrasting different stimulus onset asynchronies
(SOA) during metacontrast masking (Lau and Passingham,
2006) (but see Jannati and Di Lollo, 2012). Using these
stimulus conditions as the memoranda in WM tasks provides
a means of directly testing whether subjective visual awareness
improves visual WM. If subjectively experiencing a visual
stimulus enhances the retention of that information,
then memory performance should be better for the high-
awareness, as contrasted with the low-awareness conditions.
Because initial perceptual discrimination has been equated,
any performance differences related to awareness can be
isolated to post-perceptual WM processes such as memory
maintenance.
This paradigm can be adapted to address further questions
as to whether awareness confers any other type of benefit to
WM. By introducing distractors to the delay period of a task,
or by having participants hold multiple stimuli in mind, one
can test the role that awareness might play in the capacity
and distractor resilience of WM processes. Additionally, one
could require responses on a continuous scale as a test of
the hypothesis that subjective awareness enhances the fidelity
of WM. Another intriguing avenue for exploration would
be to present multiple items during encoding and employ
a retrocue design (Oberauer, 2002) to assess whether the
ability to shift attention between items in WM depends on
the items being represented consciously. If attention could
be allocated to unconscious items in WM (as indexed by
enhanced memory of attended information), this would shed
light on another important and ongoing debate regarding the
dissociation between attention and awareness, but in the WM
domain. In this way, relative blindsight paradigms can be
adapted to many tasks investigating the role of subjective visual
awareness in cognitive processes while circumventing confounds
and assumptions associated with creating conditions of complete
unawareness.
A limitation of the relative blindsight approach is that by
virtue of requiring a contrast between two performance-matched
stimulus conditions, physical stimulus properties (such as SOAs
or signal-to-noise ratios) also vary across conditions. With
respect to metacontrast masking, for example, it has been argued
that relative blindsight arises from a confound in the physical
stimulus attributes that drive responses at short versus long SOAs
(Jannati and Di Lollo, 2012). For this reason, a more recent
method of inducing relative blindsight, based on manipultating
signal-to-noise ratio (Zylberberg et al., 2012), may be preferred.
This issue is also problematic for studies investigating the
neural correlates of consciousness, especially those focused on
brain areas whose activity is known to reflect physical stimulus
differences, such as early visual cortex. By the same logic, this
issue may be less problematic when investigating regions whose
activity can be shown to be insensitive to physical stimulus
properties. This concern can also be mitigated analytically by
testing whether the cognitive function or neural activity under
investigation also varies with awareness within a single stimulus
configuration.
Another nuance in need of discussion is how awareness
is assessed within a relative blindsight paradigm. Researchers
can compare conditions in which stimuli are more or less
often rated as unconscious (as has been done before using
subjective “guessing” rates as an measure of percent “seen”;
Lau and Passingham, 2006), or they can induce a relative
reduction in visibility ratings using some scale, though the
stimuli may always, in some sense, be conscious. Likely both
approaches are appropriate and can address different issues.
The former procedure may be better suited to detect cognitive
functions that fully depend on conscious processing, while the
latter procedure may only show that consciousness has some
influence on the cognitive process under investigation. The latter
procedure may be more sensitive, however, in that it does not
require degrading stimuli to the point where they are sometimes
rated as unconscious, which could optimize the probability of
the “less visible” stimulus engaging other downstream cognitive
functions.
Lastly, the choice of measurement for both subjective and
objective processing deserves careful consideration. The extent to
which both measures are maximally sensitive, for example, could
alter experimental results. Popular scales of subjective awareness
are often pseudo-continuous (e.g., PAS; Overgaard et al., 2006),
yet discrimination performance is often binary (e.g., 2AFC).
If some parameter of behavioral performance did in fact vary
with awareness but was not captured by the objective measure,
relative blindsight would not have been truly established. By
having participants reproduce the exact angle of a target Gabor
patch, for example, one could compare a continuous parameter of
perceptual performance (distance from the correct angle) under
levels of continuously varying subjective visibility. As work with
this novel paradigm continues to develop, the relative blindsight
approach is best seen as a flexible tool that can complement
existing methods of investigating the role that consciousness
has in behavior while ruling out certain performance
confounds and insensitivity due to extreme stimulus
degradation.
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